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Abstract 
The EU-China coopera0on on security in Africa has remained on the level of aspira0ons and policy 
formula0on with insignificant tangible results. Tradi0onally, the EU has played a strong role in Africa’s 
security architecture, and China’s par0cipa0on within this policy area will open up areas of possible 
coopera0on and conflict. Both China and the EU share the same goals in Africa—a stable and secure 
Africa. To achieve that objec0ve, Africa, China and the EU agree, in principle, that a comprehensive 
approach that incorporates both tradi0onal and non-tradi0onal security methods, as well as a 
greater level of development support for African na0ons, must be taken. However, several challenges 
impede such coopera0on. An EU arms embargo on China, conceptual gaps between the EU and 
China in human rights and sovereignty, and increasing levels of compe00on for natural resources are 
all barriers to trilateral security. This paper outlines those challenges, focusing par0cularly on barriers 
to coopera0on in the areas of tradi0onal and non-tradi0onal security and development aid projects. 
Introduc8on  
While the European Union (EU) and the People’s Republic of China (China) have enjoyed a healthy 
economic rela0onship since the opening up of China’s economy in the early 1980s, security 
coopera0on has been, at best, limited. However, as outlined by Kirchner, Chris0ansen and Dorussen 
(2015:11), ‘Since 2003 there has been increasing understanding between the EU and China that 
security coopera0on needs to complement the economic and poli0cal dialogue’ between the two 
actors. China has had liYle involvement in interna0onal security since the start of the reform era, 
offering few opportuni0es for coopera0on or conflict between the EU and China. However, the 
presence of Chinese soldiers in Mali and South Sudan as part of the United Na0ons peacekeeping 
missions is a clear sign that China is set to increase its involvement in Africa’s security architecture. 
Yet s0ll, any poten0al partnership between the EU and China on African issues is as put by Gustaaf 
Geeraerts (2019) ‘bound to be a difficult balancing act between diverging and converging trends’ 
dangling on a ‘spectrum that extends from pure coopera0on at one end to unrestrained compe00on 
on the other.’  
The EU tradi0onally has played a strong role in Africa’s security architecture as of 2019 their where 
5000 EU troops on UN Peacekeeping mission in Africa (European External Ac0on Services 2019), and 
China’s par0cipa0on within this policy area 2000 Chinese troops on UN mission Peacekeeping in 
Africa (Zhou 2018) will open up areas of possible coopera0on and conflict. While China a state and 
the EU a unique economic and poli0cal union between 27 states not fully comparable in their 
ac0onsin many ways, China and the EU share the same goals in Africa in terms of security. Both 
actors wish to see a stable and secure Africa, and both China and the EU have outlined that to 
achieve this goal, a comprehensive approach that incorporates both tradi0onal and non-tradi0onal 
security methods, as well as a greater level of development support for African na0ons, must be 
taken (Duggan 2017). A comprehensive approach to peace and security in Africa is also an underlying 
principle of many of Africa’s regional bodies. An agreement on such an approach from all actors 
should mean that the areas of peace and security are conducive to trilateral coopera0on. Alas, 
several challenges impede such coopera0on. An EU arms embargo on China, conceptual gaps 
between the EU and China in human rights and sovereignty, and increasing levels of compe00on for 
natural resources are all barriers to trilateral security. This paper outlines those challenges, focusing 
par0cularly on barriers to coopera0on in the areas of tradi0onal and non-tradi0onal security and 
development aid projects.  
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The Challenges to China-EU Coopera8on in Africa  
Most scholars emphasise the posi0on of China and the EU in the interna0onal system to explain the 
nature of their coopera0on, or lack thereof, in Africa. The EU and its member states – par0cularly the 
tradi0onal Western powers of Germany, France, and the former member state United Kingdom (UK) 
– portray themselves as norma0ve civil powers ‘whose tradi0onal influences and advantages enable 
them to retain their global posi0on’ (Wang and Song 2016:1). On the other hand, China, a non-
Western rising global power, uses its economic preponderance to offer alterna0ve development and 
governance models to the developing world. Yet despite their historical diversity, China and the EU 
share a preference for mul0lateralism in resolving global challenges. Addi0onally, with their trade 
exceeding €1 billion a day and represen0ng a third of the global economy, they symbolise ‘new’ 
players in global governance that ‘could possibly forge an axis in global poli0cs’ (Shambaugh 
2005:7-8). Premised on the possibility of an EU China ‘axis’ in global governance, exis0ng literature 
on this coopera0on in Africa falls into two dis0nct categories.  
The first category consists of scholars who are overly op0mis0c regarding the unfolding of tradi0onal 
and non-tradi0onal security and development coopera0on between China and the European Union 
in Africa. The main premise of their op0mism is a string of coopera0ve partnership agreements 
signed between China and the EU. They assume these agreements prove that ‘Beijing and Brussels 
have expressed their willingness for coopera0on through words and deeds, including poli0cal 
support, policy consulta0on, doctrinal discussion and personnel training’ (He 2013:45). Accordingly, 
there is an assump0on that we are entering into a new era of mul0lateralism anchored on EU-China 
coopera0on. However, these authors have not significantly tested empirically whether the China–
European Union security coopera0on in Africa, Chinese and EU policy documents and coopera0on 
agreements or declara0ons have resulted in coopera0on on the ground. Their op0mism is, therefore, 
normally divorced from empirical evidence.  
The second category consists of authors who are pessimis0c regarding EU-China coopera0on in 
Africa (Hooijmaaijers 2018, Wissenbach 2011). Their view is that the two actors are locked in a rivalry 
and scramble for influence over Africa, as well as access to its primary commodi0es. According to 
these authors, the various coopera0ve and strategic partnership agreements entered into by China 
and the EU are a mere smokescreen that hide the enmity between the two. In addi0on, they point 
out a list of other challenges including ‘differences in values, fric0on in economic rela0ons, and the 
widening social percep0ons gaps’ (Li 2016:13)  
The underlying argument is that China and the EU differ fundamentally regarding ideological 
principles and norms, which hinder effec0ve EU-China coopera0on. The main reason for these 
differences as observed by Li Mingjiang, ‘has to do with the basic fact that there are many realist 
elements in the bilateral 0es. In other words, compe00on, rivalry, and different interests have 
hindered the development of Sino-EU rela0ons’ (Li 2016:13). The underlying argument is that China 
and the EU differ fundamentally regarding ideological principles and norms, which hinders any 
aYempt toward sustainable coopera0ve engagement in Africa. Part of the reason as put by Zhimin 
Chen is that the EU approaches global governance from a ‘cons0tu0onalism based on human rights’ 
approach, whereas China’s approach is ‘egalitarianism based on sovereignty’ (Chen 2016:782). It 
means that since they are ‘running on divergent sets of values and norms, they are predisposed to 
encounter points of fric0on, with different intensity, and in different contexts. These points of fric0on 
are reached inadvertently and somewhat inertly’ (Vangeli 2013:36). Stumbaum (2007) concludes 
that the EU and China agree on paper, but in prac0ce, coopera0on on, for instance, security in Africa, 
is hindered by diverse na0onal interests and conflic0ng principles.  
What is however, common for both the pessimists and the op0mists is that their analyses of EU-
China coopera0on in Africa are premised on the perspec0ve of either China or Europe. A case in 
point is a recently published edited volume, Security Rela7ons between China and the European 
Union: From Convergence to Coopera7on? which brought ‘together EU and Chinese views with a 
common research framework, involving threat percep0ons, relevant policy responses, convergence 
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levels and coopera0on aspects’ (Kirtchner, Chris0ansen, and Dorussen 2016). Stumbaum (2007) 
analyses challenges and possibili0es of coopera0on between China and Europe on security in Africa 
from a European point of view. Similarly, Kaya argues from an EU perspec0ve that ‘while China is not 
working to overhaul the exis0ng mul0lateral system, its influence on norms embodied in that system 
may revise the system away from the EU’s preferences’ (Kaya 2014:228). On the other hand, Luo 
Jianbo and Zhang Xiaomin argue ‘from the perspec0ve of Chinese scholars…that the mul0lateral 
coopera0on among China, Africa and Western countries’ will depend on their ability to build a mul0-
win model of coopera0on (2011:1794).  
The implica0on of arguing from a purely Chinese or European perspec0ve is that there is liYle 
congruence on which concepts maYer in analysing China-EU coopera0on in Africa. What is apparent 
is that those who argue from a European perspec0ve impute the Western understandings of 
concepts such as sovereignty, security and development onto the discourse, which situates the 
discussion within the Western liberal order paradigm. Similarly, those who argue from the Chinese 
perspec0ve seem to have a different non-Western interpreta0on of the concepts of coopera0on and 
strategic partnership, such that the discourse ends up being a terminology and concept discussion, 
raising the ques0on of which concepts maYer in the discussion of China-EU coopera0on in Africa.  
The second implica0on is that the discourse has focused on socialisa0on of China by the European 
Union – the main argument being that China needs to be socialised to European norms so that it 
does not undo European influence in Africa. It is common to find literature that portrays China as a 
spoiler of Europe’s development, governance and norm-socialisa0on progress in Africa (Hodzi, de 
Jager and Hartwell 2012). For example, David Shambaugh (2005:7-8) observed that as China’s global 
power and influence intensifies, it is increasingly being socialised by the European Union into taking 
more global responsibili0es in global security governance. The Chinese government’s shiq from a 
passive, indifferent approach to proac0ve engagement in global conflicts is oqen cited as evidence of 
its socialisa0on into the liberal global governance order. The focus therefore shiqs from a discussion 
of EU-China coopera0on in Africa to how much the EU has managed to persuade China to take on 
board Western liberal order norms and values in its engagement with Africa. Invariably, it reduces 
the discussion to a norma0ve analysis.  
The third but most important implica0on is that liYle research considers the influence of African 
agency in shaping how China and the EU jointly and separately respond to development and 
tradi0onal and non-tradi0onal security issues in Africa. The exclusion of African agency is pervasive 
in global governance literature because Africa is considered to be a subject of great power poli0cs 
rather than a consequen0al actor in global poli0cs. While other authors have examined the tripar0te 
China-EU-Africa rela0ons, there s0ll remains a level of ambiguity on the representa0on of Africa’s 
role in the tripar0te rela0onship, giving an impression that Africa is a peripheral and inconsequen0al 
partner to the final makeup of China-EU coopera0on on maYers of security and development in 
Africa. The wider effect is that exis0ng literature has failed to significantly recount how the web of 
bilateral and mul0lateral rela0onships among African countries, the European Union, its member 
states, and China combine to shape the nature and implementa0on of EU-China coopera0on in 
development and security in African countries. Adams Bodomo (2016), however, aYempts to show 
how these trilateral arrangements with Africa at the centre are in fact bilateral arrangements 
between, for instance, the EU and China, to achieve their interests in Africa. Nonetheless, in terms of 
policy, the EU, especially, has in proposals for trilateral coopera0on focused more on China than 
Africa, crea0ng an impression among Africans that ‘the foreigners were colluding without consul0ng 
them, in order to exploit them beYer’ (Hooijnaaijers 2018:453). Exis0ng literature, therefore, lacks 
the nuance brought by a cri0cal and purposeful examina0on of the “African factor” in China-EU 
coopera0on in Africa.  
Challenges to Coopera8on in Tradi8onal Security  
The tradi0onal security paradigm is transi0oning from state- to human-security centralism, and that 
transi0on is being partly propelled by the EU through emerging interna0onal norms such as the 
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Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Apart from emphasising human rather than state security, the norms 
are increasingly challenging the no0on of the state, and it’s pre-eminence as the main referent 
object in tradi0onal security. But that transi0on is facing challenges from countries in the Global 
South, including China and na0ons in Africa, which s0ll premise their understanding of tradi0onal 
security on essen0al values of the state – that is, its territorial integrity and poli0cal sovereignty 
(Atna 2016:175). Even in socie0es considered to be significantly ‘post-sovereignty’, Britain’s decision 
to exit the EU and the rise of ultra-na0onalist poli0cal par0es in some European countries signal the 
re-emergence of na0onalism, as well as renewed emphasis on territorial integrity and poli0cal 
sovereignty, which challenges the very essence of the EU. The implica0on is that without agreement 
between the EU, EU member states, China and Africa on management of the transi0on from a state- 
to a human-security centred tradi0onal security paradigm, the EU is unable to fully cooperate with 
China on the basis of human security, rather than state security, in Africa.  
China, as well as the majority of African countries, is opposed to a human-security centred 
tradi0onal security paradigm. For its own regime survival, China favours a strict and narrow 
interpreta0on of sovereignty, which gives pre-eminence to survival and protec0on of the state. Just 
like African countries, China considers itself to be s0ll contending with various degrees of Western 
‘interference’ in its internal affairs. In a speech delivered at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, 
on 1 April 2014, President Xi Jinping said: ‘the memory of foreign invasion and bullying has never 
been erased from the minds of the Chinese people… China is commiYed to non-interference in other 
countries’ internal affairs, and China will not allow others to interfere in its own affairs’ (Xi 2014). The 
foreign invasion and bullying that President Xi referred to mostly came from the United States and 
European powers such as Britain and France, which, in the case of Britain and France were also major 
colonial powers in Africa. The effect of this fundamental difference on how broadly or narrowly 
sovereignty should be interpreted means that China and the EU are at tangents regarding what role 
states should play in resolving tradi0onal security issues that affect them, and what role external 
actors should play. That means that for as long as African countries such as Sudan raise the issue of 
sovereignty, there is liYle chance of the EU and China coopera0ng to resolve tradi0onal security 
challenges in those countries. 
Since both China and Africa were historically subjected to European imperialism, they share a mutual 
distrust for the EU’s external security policies and strategies. As noted by President Xi in Bruges, 
Belgium, Europe’s historical imperialism and interference in the internal affairs of China, as well as in 
Africa, remains the most authorita0ve lens through which both China and Africa view and respond to 
the EU’s external security policy. For instance, the South Sudan Army (SPLA) Chief of Staff, Gen. Paul 
Malong Awan, warned the United States and Western diplomats that ‘South Sudan as a sovereign 
na0on has right and capacity to protect its ci0zens and in doing so it must deal with both internal 
and external aggressors’ (Sudan Tribune 2016). The tag of ‘external aggressor’ has been imputed by 
African countries onto the United States as well as the EU and its member states. The effect is that 
the involvement of any European country or the United States, whether the EU supports the 
involvement or not, is considered in Africa as an ac0on by all member states of the EU. To avoid 
being tarred by the same brush, China has been careful to support the posi0on of the African Union. 
For instance, on Libya, China abstained, arguing that it had done so at the request of the African 
Union. Although Germany also abstained, the involvement of NATO was interpreted in Africa, and 
later by China, as involvement of the European Union and the whole Western world.  
Related to the above is that Africa’s separate engagements with the EU and with China are based on 
contradictory norms and values. EU-Africa rela0ons are arguably due to pressure from the EU, ‘based 
on norms focused on the civilian popula0on, human rights and conflict preven0on’ (van der PuYen 
and Chu 2011:199). Kaya agrees that in Africa, ‘the EU has relied on the effec0ve ins0tu0onal 
mechanism outlined in its preferen0al trade agreements, especially with its former colonies, to 
coerce trading partners in the case of human rights viola0ons’ (Kaya 2014:219). The 2005 Cotonou 
Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) and the European Council 
(EC) emphasise respect for human rights, democracy and good governance as non-nego0able in the 
two regions’ rela0ons. This insistence by the EC has been a source of conflict between Africa and the 
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EU. For instance, in 2003, the EU-Africa summit was postponed because European countries refused 
to allow President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe to aYend because of his poor human rights record 
and sanc0ons they imposed on his government, much to the chagrin of some African countries who 
insisted that he aYend. Among other things, the incident revealed the deep-seated conflict of norms 
and principles between the EU and Africa. Contrary to the EU’s approach, China’s insistence on non-
interference in the internal affairs of African states and emphasis on the right of African countries to 
choose their own development and governance models has made rela0ons with China more 
appealing to most African leaders. Consequently, because they deal with Africa on the basis of 
different norms and principles, it is difficult for the EU and China to effec0vely cooperate on 
tradi0onal security issues in Africa.  
Principles of the EU are largely inimical to the interests of African leaders in countries such as South 
Sudan, the Democra0c Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and Sudan. Thus, the EU is treated by those 
countries as an ‘intruding other’ in their rela0onship with China. Chinese officials also hold the same 
view concerning the EU in Africa. As noted by Ambassador Guijin (2010):  
Roughly two years ago, when the EU was about to draE a document for EU-China-Africa trilateral 
coopera7on, we asked our embassies in Africa to consult their host countries. The result was mixed. 
Some were enthusias7c about the idea, and some opposed it. For the majority it sounded good, but 
they had worries. They told us, we are working together so well, why make things so complicated, 
why make things more expensive. Because they know that their coopera7on with China is more 
effec7ve and the costs of Chinese projects are low.  
For fear of complica0ng its rela0onship with Africa, China is wary of being considered by African 
countries as working in collusion with the EU to dominate Africa. That fear subsequently influences 
the degree of China’s coopera0on with the European Union on tradi0onal security issues in Africa.  
The EU has substan0al geopoli0cal and strategic interests in Africa, but its influence in Africa has 
been waning. The rise of China and other emerging powers such as India, South Africa, Russia and 
Brazil that have compe0ng strategic interests in Africa have emboldened most African countries to 
side-line and some0mes outright reject the EU.  
The most important difficulty for European poli0cal and economic elites is to accept that the 
hegemonic historical posi0on they enjoyed for centuries has not only been challenged by the US 
since the 20th century but is now being challenged by China, a newcomer with different tradi0ons, 
and poten0ally will be challenged further by other emerging powers like India in the course of this 
century. (Burnay, Defraigne and Wouters 2015:14)  
Leaders of African countries have reiterated that European powers are condescending in their 
engagement with Africa. Accordingly, principles such as ‘African solu0ons to African problems’ are 
partly mo0vated by Africa’s need to curtail Western interference in African conflicts. China has been 
careful to tailor its interven0on in African conflicts along lines that are preferable to African countries 
(Hodzi 2018). As noted by China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, at the Johannesburg Summit of the 
Forum on China-Africa Coopera0on (FOCAC) in December 2015, China supports ‘African people to 
solve Africa’s problems in an African way, because African brothers know the best about the actual 
situa0on and are the most qualified to solve their problems’ (Wang 2015). Although China is 
gradually shiqing from its strict adherence to non-interference to ‘construc0ve engagement’, it s0ll 
aligns its posi0on regarding tradi0onal security in Africa to that of the African Union and of regional 
organisa0ons such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).  
The EU-China coopera0on on tradi0onal security in Africa is also hindered by the absence of 
harmony between the EU’s external security policy and that of its individual member states. EU 
member states follow EU policy. They do so, however, with differing emphasis. Analysing the security 
policies of Britain, France and Germany, Wang (2015) concludes that all three countries ‘support the 
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spirit of the ESS in their na0onal concepts’, but what he fails to show is that, in prac0ce, these three 
countries deal with both tradi0onal and non-tradi0onal security issues in Africa differently. The 
rela0onship between China and EU member states is not uniform with each member state but 
varies. For instance, despite  Germany’s opposi0on to military interven0on in Libya, several other EU 
Member States, through NATO intervened (Brockmeier 2013). Thus, Europe must:  
...deal with the contradic7ons between the strategy of the EU proper and that of some of its member 
states. The least one can say is that the use of hard power by some EU member states, as in the case 
of Libya, Iraq or Ivory Coast, and the non-transparent diplomacies of some member states which are 
at odds with the principles laid down at the suprana7onal level by the EU ins7tu7ons, do not 
encourage China to trust the EU as a credible partner in a triangular dialogue. (Burnay, Defraigne 
and Wouters 2015:15)  
Notably, ‘the fact that the EU is not a state carries with it limita0ons regarding the cohesion of its 
security policy, with security and defence policy remaining largely the preroga0ve of member 
states’ (Kirtchner, Chris0ansen and Dorussen 2016:1). The resul0ng lack of agreement among EU 
member states and the EU on how to resolve tradi0onal security issues in Africa severely limits its 
ability to cooperate with China. The reason for the lack of harmony at the EU is that France, Britain 
and Belgium have maintained strong poli0cal and economic interests in their former colonies.  
Challenges to Coopera8on in Non-Tradi8onal Security  
The transboundary nature of non-tradi0onal security and the spill over effect of insecurity from 
Africa to both Europe and China have contributed to making coopera0on between the EU and China 
poten0ally possible. Both ‘have a shared interest in regional and global stability facilita0ng economic 
growth’ (Chris0ansen 2016:30). Giving the much-cited example of the influence of piracy on the EU’s 
and China’s economic interests, Fanoulis and Kirchner (2016) point out that such global crises raise 
the need for more global coopera0on to address non-tradi0onal security challenges. But, as the 
response to the piracy crisis off the coast of Somalia reveals, there was minimal coopera0on 
between the EU and China. Far from being a strategic coopera0on, the sharing of intelligence and 
joint patrols were more ‘ad hoc’. Part of the reason for the absence of EU-China strategic coopera0on 
on non-tradi0onal security in Africa is their diverging interpreta0on of ‘coopera0on’.  
In dealing with non-tradi0onal security issues in Africa, China tends to take a more bilateral 
approach, pragma0cally balancing its non-interven0on principle, with its economic interests. 
According to China’s posi0on paper on the New Security Concept (2002), ‘coopera0on under the new 
security concept should be flexible and diversified in form and model. It could be a mul0lateral 
security mechanism of rela0vely strong binding force or a forum-like mul0-lateral security dialogue. 
It could also be a confidence-building bilateral security dialogue or a non-governmental dialogue of 
an academic nature. The promo0on of greater interac0on of economic interests is another effec0ve 
means of safeguarding security.’ On the other hand, ‘the EU tends to adopt a more mul0lateral/
holis0c approach that takes into account the impact on the neighbouring countries as well as the 
impact on regional integra0on processes’ (Burnay, Defraigne and Wouters 2015:11). The fact that 
China is not commiYed to an inflexible mul0lateral coopera0on framework makes it difficult for the 
EU to build a sustainable coopera0on with China on non-tradi0onal security in Africa. 
China regards non-tradi0onal security as within the domain of the affected state. It argues that the 
responsibility to respond and protect a country’s ci0zens falls on the affected government first. Other 
states can intervene only at the invita0on of the concerned government. This posi0on is included in 
China’s policy paper on the New Security Strategy, in which it states ‘that all countries, big or small, 
are equal members of the interna0onal community and should respect each other, treat each other 
as equals, refrain from interfering in other countries’ internal affairs and promote the 
democra0za0on of the interna0onal rela0ons.’ Based on that approach, China does not consider 
most non-tradi0onal security issues in Africa as maYers of its security concern except in cases where 
they directly affect its economic interests or the security of overseas Chinese na0onals. This explains 
why it responded swiqly to the piracy crisis off Somalia’s coast but was hesitant to intervene in the 
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Darfur crises un0l its indifferent posi0on threatened the success of the Beijing Olympics. In many 
respects, this has been a point of conflict between the EU and China, because the EU considers 
China’s rise in Africa as ‘posing a challenge on to the EU’s ability to spread new sovereignty. New 
sovereignty holds that sovereignty is violable and interference in other states’ affairs is valid, 
specifically when human rights issues are concerned’ (Kaya 2014:216). Accordingly, ‘compe00on and 
conflict have recently increased: interven0on and responsibility in crisis regions such as Libya and 
Syria…human rights and sovereignty issues…are key areas of conflict’ (Austermann and Wang 
2013:4).  
The EU is cau0ous of China’s rise, as well as the possible security, economic and poli0cal 
consequences of that rise in Africa. The major concern is the difference in how the EU and China 
explain the causes of terrorism and other non-tradi0onal issues in Africa. Ini0ally, China did not 
consider non-tradi0onal threats in Africa to be of its concern un0l the piracy phenomenon in the 
Gulf of Aden. As noted by Li Wei, director of the An0-Terrorism Research Centre at the China 
Ins0tute of Contemporary Interna0onal Rela0ons, ‘sending troops to join the Somali an0-piracy 
mission signals the change in China’s concept of security from the tradi0onal to the non-
tradi0onal’ (Wu and Peng 2008). This, in turn, affects the approach the EU and China take in dealing 
with such challenges. The EU normally considers issues of terrorism and violence by non-state actors 
in Africa as symptoma0c of poor governance and state fragility. China, however, sees the same 
challenges as a result of lack of development. Accordingly, while the EU supported the imposi0on of 
sanc0ons on Sudan for the Darfur crisis, China invested extensively in Sudan’s oil sector. This suggests 
that where the EU applies the ‘s0ck’, China applies the ‘carrot’, making coopera0on between the two 
problema0c. Thus, as noted by Wang Jianwei and Song Weiqing, the EU China distrust ‘has 
manifested in real poli0cal problems between the two sides, with issues of security, poli0cal 
suspicion, trade and economic fric0on. The “market economy status,” arms embargoes, and the 
human rights situa0on in China are oqen causes for concern’ (2016:5). This explains why China has 
insisted in China’s Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
for Mutual Benefit and Win-Win Coopera7on, which outlines that counter-terrorism exchanges and 
coopera0on between China and the EU should be based on principles of mutual respect and equal-
footed coopera0on rather than double standards. 
China’s emphasis on equality and mutual respect rather than double standards is aimed at 
precluding the EU from interfering in its own internal issues, par0cularly how it responds to the 
‘terrorist’ acts of minority Chinese such as the Uighurs and Tibetans. ‘At a 0me when the EU is 
increasingly keen to promote interven0on in the affairs of third states in case of severe threats 
against civilian popula0ons and massive human rights viola0ons, China – and many other non-
Western countries – opposes the doctrines of human interven0on and of the responsibility to 
protect’ (Burnay, Defraigne and Wouters 2015:11). China is wary of extensive coopera0on with the 
EU, because it fears the EU might use the coopera0on to intervene in China’s non-tradi0onal security 
issues. Therefore, China limits its coopera0on with the EU in Africa to intelligence and personnel 
informa0on sharing, which has made EU diplomats argue that China uses such flexible and ad hoc 
exchanges as intelligence gathering opportuni0es rather than as genuine coopera0on. This also feeds 
into the percep0on that China is a free rider, only seeking coopera0on when it suits its na0onal 
interests.  
Challenges to Coopera8on in Development Projects  
In order to achieve both tradi0onal and non-tradi0onal security goals in Africa, all three actors – 
China, the EU and Africa – agree that economic development of the con0nent is necessary. 
Deliberately or not, the presence of China and other emerging donors has substan0ally transformed 
the context in which development is to occur in Africa and has changed the context for tradi0onal 
donors, such as the EU (MAH 2015:48). Data on Chinese development Aid to Africa is difficult to pin 
down bodies such as AidData have reported that China spent $354.3 billion over the 15-year period 
from 2000 to 2014 (AidData 2020). As outlined by Grimm and Hackenesch (2012), China’s presence 
in Africa as a donor is now the biggest external challenge to European development policy in Africa – 
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even though the EU is s0ll Africa’s biggest official donor (European Commission 2020). Historical links 
that both China and the EU have with Africa have created different narra0ves, which have shaped 
their donor rela0onships with the con0nent. As outlined by Jin Ling (2010:6):  
Historically, China and the EU have had very different kinds of rela7onships with Africa, which 
con7nue to influence contemporary conduct. The colonial past has been a heavy burden in EU–Africa 
rela7ons, but has nonetheless laid a solid founda7on for the so-called donor–recipient rela7onship 
model of engagement. Unlike the EU, China has a history of being colonised, like Africa, and is today 
facing similar development challenges to those faced by the con7nent, so it has been easier for China 
and Africa to create a rela7onship based on common perspec7ves on issues such as sovereignty and 
na7onal priori7es.  
The varying historical rela0onships that each actor has had with Africa do act in some way as a 
barrier to trilateral coopera0on. However, two key aspects that are common to both China’s and the 
EU’s models of development aid prevent coopera0on in this area and create challenges for each 
actor’s individual model.  
First, China’s own economic development success offers a clear alterna0ve to the Western 
development model, which in part is linked to the liberal democra0c model. This alterna0ve 
approach challenges the European assump0ons of how development is designed and provided, as 
well as the underlying norms and principles linked to the democracy movement and good 
governance (Grauls and Stahl 2012). China’s economic success, which has been achieved without 
democra0c reforms, has led the European donor community to re-evaluate the long-held link in 
Western development studies between democra0c reforms and economic growth in transi0on 
countries. The concept of achieving rapid economic growth without democra0c reforms is an 
appealing concept for many African elites and leaders, who have pointed to China as a contrary 
example when Europe has raised the link between economic growth and democra0c reforms. Good 
governance and democracy lie at the heart of the EU’s norma0ve understanding of development and 
therefore is a core aspect of its donor model. The Chinese model of development is incompa0ble 
with the EU’s norma0ve understanding and therefore is a major barrier to coopera0on between both 
actors in terms of economic development aid. Chinese economic success is also taking place during a 
period when Europe’s economic model has shown very slow economic growth, as well as a number 
of economic crises, most notably the euro crisis. Slow economic growth has resulted in 0ghter 
European public budgets, reducing EU member states’ ability to contribute to development aid in 
Africa (Siles-Brügge 2014)  
Second, beyond China’s historical links with Africa and its appeal as an economic development 
model, China’s donor model itself is a challenge to the EU’s role as a donor in Africa and the EU’s 
development policy in Africa. As China is a non-OECD member, it is not held to the same condi0ons 
and standards when providing aid (Mawunou and Gabas 2012). China’s trade and aid model, which 
claims poli0cal neutrality, offers a clear alterna0ve to the charity-based development model, which 
in part is linked to Europe’s colonial history in Africa. The Chinese aid model also has an emphasis on 
South-South Coopera0on with African countries, which is based on mutual benefit or win-win 
coopera0on. This is in direct contradic0on with the EU’s aid model, which is, at least in rhetoric if not 
in reality, based on the principle that aid should not serve a donor’s interests in the first place. While 
the Chinese aid model does not incorporate any poli0cal condi0ons (other than the One China 
policy), it does come in the form of 0ed development projects, whereby China provides large-scale 
infrastructure projects. For example, in Angola, Chinese lines of credit have been used almost 
en0rely for infrastructure projects and, rather than transferring money directly, the projects are 
completed by Chinese state-owned construc0on companies (Croese 2012:126). In such projects, 
Chinese official aid flows are not channelled through African budgets, decreasing transparency on 
projects and also offer rent-seeking opportuni0es (Bräu0gam 2011). The European development 
community also cri0cises the use of Chinese companies and labour on these Chinese development 
projects in Africa, as well as a lack of environmental planning (Xiaofang 2014, Jing 2009). It is feared 
that the use of Chinese labour and Chinese companies prevents the spillover of benefits – such as 
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knowledge and wealth transfers – to local African communi0es. While the Chinese have taken steps 
to take environmental planning and spill over benefits into considera0on when designing 
development projects in Africa, these factors are s0ll not as advanced as the OECD standard. The 
different model of delivering development aid to Africa by both China and the EU is, in itself, a 
challenge to trilateral coopera0on (Carbone 2011).  
Third, similar to security issues, individual EU Member States are seeking bilateral coopera0on with 
China on development issues in Africa - which alienates the EU. For example, France’s president 
Emmanuel Macron persuaded President Xi Jinping that France and China need to cooperate and 
deepen their engagement in Africa. Soon aqer their mee0ng in January 2019, the French Agency for 
Development and the China Development Bank agreed to partner to support climate change projects 
in Africa. Germany, the biggest economy in con0nental Europe has been seeking to increase its 
footprint in Africa. To enhance its Africa engagement it announced its own Marshall Plan for Africa 
and established the Sino-German Center for Sustainable Development on 11 May 2017 - which 
according to its official website is premised on a shared understanding that ‘during the past years, 
China and Germany realized the synergies between official development assistance as delivered by 
Germany and foreign aid and south-south coopera0on as provided by China’. Based in Beijing, the 
Centre is a joint ini0a0ve between the Federal Ministry for Economic Coopera0on and Development 
of the Federal Republic of Germany (BMZ) and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China (MofCom). Part of the Centre’s role is to ‘iden0fy, assess, prepare, accompany and monitor 
trilateral coopera0on projects between Germany, China, and third countries, par0cularly in Africa 
and Asia.’  
Despite these challenges and barriers to trilateral coopera0on between China, Africa and the EU, the 
European Commission has sought to engage China and African countries in trilateral dialogue 
(Grimm and Hackenesch 2016). Basing on issues they converge on, China and the EU agreed to 
engage Africa on poverty eradica0on, support the Africa Union’s Agenda 2063 and for Africa to 
ac0vely par0cipate in mul0lateral ini0a0ves on security and UN peacekeeping. This convergence of 
objec0ves in Africa led to establishment of the EU-China-Africa Expert Working Group on 
Conven0onal Arms in 2012. However, this aYempt to create trilateral dialogue has, for the most part, 
failed. The dialogue has remained on the level of policy formula0on and strongly bilateral in its 
engagement between China and the EU, with African states and/or regional organisa0ons side-lined. 
This has created a bilateral dialogue between China and the EU about Africa rather than a trilateral 
dialogue. The lack of a free and independent development community within Chinese civil society 
has also prevented trilateral coopera0on from occurring below the state level. Without trilateral 
coopera0on or trilateral dialogue between the three actors, direct compe00on will con0nue 
between China and the EU in the area of development aid. This direct compe00on in itself will 
prevent both actors from achieving their goals in Africa.  
Conclusion  
In terms of security, trilateral coopera0on or trilateral dialogue between China, the EU and Africa 
faces a number of challenges. While both China and the EU have a comprehensive approach to 
security in Africa, which would require both tradi0onal and non-tradi0onal security approaches, as 
well as a greater level of development support for African na0ons, both actors have differing 
approaches to enac0ng these policies. In terms of trilateral coopera0on in the tradi0onal security, 
there are two main challenges. The first is a prac0cal ques0on that has faced the EU since its 
founda0on – that is, a lack of coordina0on among member states in terms of its external security 
policy. The EU’s security rela0onship with Africa is mainly led by former colonial powers such as 
France and Britain. This lack of coordina0on by European actors is a key challenge for trilateral 
coopera0on in tradi0onal security. Both China and leading actors in Africa can play divide and rule 
with the EU by pitng member states against one another. At the same 0me, the EU is not viewed as 
a credible actor due to the fact that it only intervenes when it has direct economic interests, and 
‘only when the security risk to European troops is low, and when the European Great Powers seek to 
demonstrate European power interna0onally’ (Gegout 2010:134). The second main challenge for 
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trilateral coopera0on in tradi0onal security is the understanding of security held by all three actors. 
The EU’s understanding of security has a focus on human security rather than a state-centric security, 
which is held by China and many African states. In terms of security coopera0on, these diverging 
understandings of security mean that areas of coopera0on are limited to where both understandings 
intersect – that is, where both human and state security are under threat. In terms of trilateral 
coopera0on in non-tradi0onal security, again the EU and China face the problem of different 
interpreta0ons of ‘coopera0on’. In dealing with non-tradi0onal security issues in Africa, China tends 
to view the promo0on of greater interac0on of economic interests as another effec0ve means of 
safeguarding security. This is done on a bilateral level. The EU tends to adopt a more mul0lateral/
holis0c approach that takes into account the regional impact. The fact that China is not commiYed to 
a mul0lateral coopera0on framework makes it difficult for the EU to build coopera0on with China on 
non-tradi0onal security in Africa. Both China and the EU agree that for tradi0onal and non-
tradi0onal security to be achieved in Africa, economic development needs to increase on the 
con0nent and encompass a central part of any comprehensive security approach. However, both 
China and the EU have fundamental different understandings of development aid and of a wider 
concept of economic development. While the EU remain African’s biggest investor and donor the 
EU’s focus on good governance and China’s focus on investment Aid model lead to direct compe00on 
in the area of development aid, but also in the wider understanding of the link between economic 
development and human rights. In terms of tradi0onal and non-tradi0onal security, as well as of a 
comprehensive security approach involving development aid, trilateral coopera0on between China, 
the EU and Africa faces a number of challenges. At the heart of these challenges is a lack of 
understanding of the approach of the other actors. Overcoming these challenges requires each actor 
to change what is, for the most part, a fundamental concept of their norma0ve approach of 
interna0onal security.  
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